A matter of Honor
By Orlando S. Mercado
Secretary General, EROPA
Former Senator of the Republic of the Philippines
16 September 2011
(Speech read on the occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Philippine Senate’s rejection of the Philippines-United States Military Bases Agreement on September 16, 1991)
**On September 16, 1991, after a 15-month negotiation with the United States, the Philippine Senate rejected the extension of US Military bases in the Philippines. For the Agreement to hold, it requires 2/3 votes of the 24 members of the Senate. Twelve senators voted against the extension of the US bases in the country.
In 1995, barely four years after our historic vote rejecting the RP-US Bases Treaty, I had to revisit the issue while writing my doctoral dissertation on the dynamics of the bases negotiations. I was still a senator, and was fortunate to have been given access to both American and Filipino officials involved in the negotiations. Most of the American negotiators were still in Washington but I had to go Haiti to talk to Stanley Schrager, the spokesman for the American panel. I remember the interview not so much for where it was done but for what Schrager said.
"There was that disconnect. I mean we lost it, none on economic grounds, although we were very cheap on it, but we lost to sovereign nationalistic grounds. What we should have perceived, and what we were beginning to perceive once the Senate debate began, was that this thing was not going to be resolved on economic grounds as we have thought, it was not going to be resolved in terms of ideals of democracy around the world, but was going to be resolved in terms of whether the Filipinos were ready yet to break with the United States on these bases. And all of a sudden we should have seen this coming."
Since the Philippines would be celebrating its 100th year of independence in 1998, most of us Senators believed that the celebration would be less meaningful with the continuing presence up to year 2001 of the US military bases which have long been regarded as an infringement on Philippine sovereignty.
We also viewed the compensation package of $203 million as insufficient to have any effect on the economy of the country.
President George H.W. Bush’s letter to President Cory Aquino dated August 23, 1991 indicated twice that all areas of compensation requiring funding would be subject to the approval of the US Congress. In other words, it was on a best efforts basis.
Antagonism and mistrust characterized the exchanges between the Philippines and the United States throughout the 15-month long negotiations. Thus, when the Senate rejected the Treaty, the leadership of the US government reacted negatively. In the negotiations for the phase out of Subic Naval Base in the latter part of 1991, it was only the US Navy that was reticent in giving up Subic. However, the White House had grown tired of the Philippine bases issue and in December 1991, President Bush directed the State Department and Defense Department to commence withdrawal procedures. The Americans took everything that could be removed from the bases. These included the floating dry docks which President Aquino herself had requested be left behind. It may also have been easier for the Americans to leave the Philippines because of the diminished importance of fixed overseas military bases for forward deployment. US defense strategy was moving toward a sea-and-air posture from land-based deployments that characterized the Cold War decades. However, Subic Naval Base would still have been an important supply depot and repair facility. In addition, the Soviets had already withdrawn from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.
It was a time when one part of the national psyche wanted to assert independence, and the other part felt it needed more time to be weaned from dependence on US assistance. It was a time when the bases issue was the only foreign policy issue that the Philippines had to resolve. We tried to funnel the entire Philippine-American relations through the bases issue which was a security issue. There were only two bases on which almost all policy was dependent. The negotiations, Senate rejection and withdrawal of the Americans were like bitter divorce proceedings. (I used to liken it to the much publicized divorce proceedings of film director Woody Allen and actress Mia Farrow at the time). The Americans did not expect the Philippine Senate to end the basing relationship on a matter of honor.
With the rejection of the bases, the dependence of the Philippines on the US for aid ended. The absence of the prospect of aid has spurred economic reform. Even economic losses from the withdrawal of the bases are now fairly contained. We have proven the doomsday Sayers wrong about how we would handle these former military facilities.
For the first time, without the American security protective umbrella, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had to think through its own national defense strategy and shift to an external defense mode. In the past, the arrangement was that the US took care of our external defense and the AFP concentrated on the insurgency problem.
We blamed the Americans for everything that went wrong and praised them for everything that went right because of their presence. Today, we have only ourselves to praise or blame for our mistakes. By ending the basing relationship, we have regained our capacity to believe in ourselves, to redeem ourselves and yes, to allow ourselves honor when it is deserved. We chose a path that changed the history of our nation. The Philippines has more vigor now as an active member of ASEAN, the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations and other international organizations where Filipinos are given a greater degree of respect as compared to when the Philippines was regarded as staunchly aligned with the US on many issues by default. The Philippines relationship with the Arab states has also improved. It is hoped that this will bring us finally to a negotiated peace agreement for Mindanao.
Another positive result of the American withdrawal is that ASEAN is now openly discussing regional security in military terms. ASEAN has been too self-conscious in discussing security issues in the past. With a vibrant ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) strategic security concerns are being addressed.
Whatever honor and pride we have gained in the post-bases era needs to be tempered by humility and hard work. We pride ourselves with being a democratic nation, where there is tolerance for the plurality of beliefs and ideas. But, we need to excel, we need to confront inequity in society, and we need to keep moving forward.
What Stanley Schrager told me is correct. The Americans lost the bases to our sense of nationalism. Twenty years after our collective decision, and in the midst of a rapidly globalizing world, we can ask ourselves: Is it still relevant to commemorate this event? Baylis and Smith, the authors of The Globalization of World Politics, say that nationalism is both an idea of a history, a tradition, and one of obligation. There are those who would insist that nationalism is a thing of the past. However the invocation of history is at the heart of how we view ourselves as a people. It provides us the basis of our legitimacy as a nation. We voted no, when we were actually saying yes to a sense of common identity and of national purpose. It was a matter of honor, a matter that would extract no price. I thank our people for giving me the opportunity to be part of that process.
**The views in this article are solely of Dr. Mercado. He does not necessarily represent the views of the organization.
